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The Court of Common Pleas
BY CECIL MEAD DRAPER*
For upward of five hundred years, perhaps the most important
court to the average freeman in England-the court with which he had
his most frequent contacts-was the Court of Common Pleas. It is
often referred to as one of the common law courts, and the designation
is singularly appropriate. For not only was it a court whose jurisdiction
was confined to actions arising under the common law (as modified, of
course, by statute), but it was a court in which a large portion of that
law was developed. Like the common law, it was not born; rather it
evolved, and its evolution followed the exact pattern of, and was con-
temporaneous with that of the common law.
We shall attempt to trace in outline form the origin of the court,
its development, its form in maturity, its decline and its ultimate abo-
lition.
I. THE KING'S COUNCIL
Since, as is generally conceded, the Court of Common Pleas is an
outgrowth of the Curia Regis, it would perhaps be of value to consider
briefly the formation, composition, and a few of the duties or privileges
of that body.
The term Curia Regis is used in two senses. It means (1) the
place where the king resided attended by the chief officials of his court
and household; and (2) the supreme central court where the business
of government in all its branches was transacted.1 It is the latter meaning
which is of interest to the legal and constitutional historian; and it is
the meaning which will hereafter be attached to the term.
The Curia Regis was similar to the old Anglo-Saxon Witan. Both
assemblies usually met three times a year, those meetings generally being
held at the periods of the three church festivals of Christmas, Easter and
Pentecost,2 and their constitutions were so similar that the Anglo-Saxon
chronicler has no difficulty in calling the assemblies of the Curia Regis,
Witans. Notwithstanding this general similarity, the two bodies were
*Member of the Denver bar.
Xl THOMAS MADOX, HISTORY OF THE EXCHEQUER (1769) 81-82.
21 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 32.
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fundamentally different. Just as Norman feudalism differed from the
incipient feudalism of the Anglo-Saxon period in the fact that the for-
mer was grounded upon a logical theory of tenure from which all the
rights and duties of lords and tenants flowed, 3 so the Curia Regis dif-
fered from the Anglo-Saxon Witan by the rigid application of this same
theory of tenure to the composition of this assembly. It was, like the
Curia Ducis of Normandy,4 composed in theory, if not of all the king's
tenants-in-chief, at least of all who held per baroniam. As Cross states
in speaking of the effects of the Norman conquest, "The old National
Assembly continued to meet, usually three times a year, on Easter at
Winchester, Whitsunside at Westminster, and Christmas at Gloucester.
Now, however, it was called the Great Council (Magnum Concilium)
or King's Court (Curia Regis); also where it formerly consisted of
Englishmen, it now consisted largely of Normans; finally, the bishops
and great landed nobles came, henceforth, not by virtue of their office,
but as tenants-in-chief of the Crown." 5 Among these tenants-in-chief
were comprised all the officials of the government, and in addition any
other persons whom the king chose to summon.'
The Curia Regis was the king's court, and of it the king was both
an essential and an active member. It was therefore an itinerant court
which followed the king in his progresses over England, and in his
journeyings over his continental dominions. Richard of Anesty has left
us a graphic account of his journeys to Normandy and Gascony, be-
tween the years 1158 and 1163, to get from the king and his Curia the
necessary writs for the conduct of his law suit. 7 Often the king heard
suitors in person," and there is no doubt that Henry II's ceaseless activity
kept the men who staffed his court up to their work.
We have seen that the court itself was in theory composed of the
king's tenants-in-chief, the royal officials, and anyone else whom the
king chose to summon. In practice we can discern two chief types of
assembly. On important occasions it was a large assembly composed of
all the leading landowners and officials of the country. It was such an
assembly as this which inquired into the law as to the boundaries of
lay and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in order to draw up the Constitutions
3ADAMS, ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1912) 65.
"He (the Duke of Normandy) holds a court; we dare hardly as yet call it a
court of his tenants-in-chief; but it is an assembly of the great men, and the great men
are his vassals." I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.
1898) 73.
5CROSS, SHORTER HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN (1924) 59.
"'The feudal law provided in no way for the attendance of the non-vassal. Yet it
seems clear that the king had the right to make persons whom we cannot show to have
been his vassals full members of the court." ADAMS, ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CON-
STITUTION (1912) 61.
'I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 158-159.
8M. M. BIGELOW, PLACITA ANGLO-NORMANICA (1879) 212, 214.
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of Clarendon. But probably the ordinary work of government was
done by a small body of officials." Of such a kind was probably the
assembly which passed wakeful nights in drawing up the assize of novel
disseisin.
It will not be necessary to trace the development of these two bodies
in detail. The larger assembly, especially after the time of John, tended
to become a body which criticized or opposed the government, while the
smaller remained a body of officials who were the king's servants.10 The
larger body led ultimately to the present House of Lords, while the
smaller remained as the administrative officials of government.
Like other feudal councils the Curia Regis, using the term in the
larger sense, was a legislative, an administrative, and a judicial body.
It dealt with judicial cases beyond the competence of the local and
church courts and with others where they failed to render justice. With
the successive increases in the duties of the Curia Regis these duties be-
came increasingly more burdensome, and also the various classes of duties
became increasingly more technical. It was but natural that those mem-
bers of the Council most capable in certain lines should be assigned to
those lines. Such indeed was the case. It has already been noted that the
larger assembly became involved more exclusively in legislative func-
tions. In the smaller body the first separation seems to have been in the
direction of finance and judicature.-
This process had its beginning as early as the reign of Henry I,
but it gained momentum in the reign of Henry II. The legislation of the
latter added enormously to the jurisdiction of the Curia Regis. As a
result, the king's court acquired a wide criminal and civil jurisdiction,
and wide powers of supervision over the conduct of all the local courts
and officials. In the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton Henry II
asserted its exclusive jurisdiction over all serious crimes. In the ordinance
of the Grand Assize and the legislation establishing the petty assizes
he asserted its jurisdiction over most disputes relating to land held by
free tenure; and even if a dispute relating to such land, or the services
upon which such land was held was taken to a lord's court, the lord
could not exercise jurisdiction without the king's writ.1 Under the
feudal system, which made landholding the basis of so many relations
between man and man, this large jurisdiction over this class of cases
meant the absorption by the king's court of jurisdiction over All the most
important civil pleas.
All this jurisdiction was exercised through the machinery of royal
"J. F. BALDWIN, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDi.E
AGES (1913) 10-15.
101 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 41.
"Ibid. 40-41.
121 2 GLANVIL 25.
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writs. But the fact that it was thus exercised did not as yet hinder its
capacity for expansion. "As yet," says Maitland, "the king is no mere
vendor, he is a manufacturer and can make goods to order; the day has
not yet come when the invention of new writs will be hampered by the
claims of a parliament; but still in Glanvil's day the officina justitiae
has already a considerable store of ready-made wares and English law
is already taking the form of a commentary upon writs."'
13 Indeed,
Bracton says that there should be a writ for every form of action in the
king's court."4
As the result of this expansion of jurisdiction, the Curia Regis in
Henry II's reign no longer confined its attention to great men and great
causes. It was a tribunal where all classes of causes were tried. Indeed,
the privilege of being sued only in the Curia Regis was occasionally
granted to certain persons. 15 The popularity of royal justice is attested
by the fact that litigants were willing to pay fines for writs, for pleas,
for trials, for judgment, for expedition, or for delay.16 As might be
expected, most of the litigation dealt with land, but there were cases in
which the amount in dispute was small; and we can see further that the
volume of business done was great.' 7
The cause for the popularity of the Curia Regis is easy to see. In
the first place, it could both compel the appearance of the defendant and
enforce its judgments with all the strength of the central government.
In the second place, its. methods of procedure both in civil and in crim-
inal cases were superior to those of the older courts. The jury, even at
this time, was finding favor both in civil and criminal cases. Maitland
tells us that "In a proprietary action for land or for advowson, the
'tenant,' the passive party, may, rejecting battle, 'put himself upon the
grand assize of our lord the king,' and an inquest will then declare who
has the better right." ' In the third place, the fact that litigants could
get from it writs ordering sheriffs or lords to hear cases was at any rate
some security that the cases would be heard;'9 and, if they were not fairly
heard, the litigant was at liberty to apply for further writs, or even to
take the case before the Curia itself. In the fourth place, litigants secured
a tribunal which was staffed by the ablest lawyers of the day.
20
'31 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 15 1.
""Tbt erunt formulae brevium quot genera actionum." BALDWIN, THE KING'S
COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES (1913) 49.
"BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 8, 156; 1 MADOX, op. cit. supra note 1, 116-119.
1l HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 48.
"!Ibid.
'81 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 149.
"Ibid. 158-159.
'At this time there was of course no legal profession in the sense in which we
understand that term today. In England we do not meet the practitioner of law until
about the time of the establishment of the Inns of Court, which was somewhat later
than this. However, if we use the term "lawyer" as "one versed in the laws," then
perhaps the statement above will not be misleading."
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II. THE ITINERANT JUSTICES
The principle behind the act of sending out itinerant justices was
not new. The development of those offices was but another example of
that practice which must be well known to every student of English
constitutional history, namely, the practice of causing an old institution
to serve a new purpose. Royal commissioners were sent through the
country on royal business soon after the Norman conquest. In earlier
times the king himself journeyed over the country administering justice.
He did not cease to do so after the conquest. But it is only after the
conquest that we meet with these delegates of the Curia Regis. William
the Conqueror used them to collect the information from which Domes-
day Book was compiled. We know from the Pipe Roll of the Exchequer
that Henry I sent them around the country on fiscal business. 21 Even in
Stephen's reign, justices traveled over the country to hear the civil and
criminal pleas of the crown.
22
These traveling emissaries of the king acted under various commis-
sions. "Under the assizes of Clarendon and Northampton they heard
criminal and civil pleas of the crown, and had in addition other duties
which were administrative in character. ' ' 2  Often they acted in a fiscal
capacity. Perhaps more often they were responsible for the king's infor-
mation as to his feudal dues. They inquired into escheats, wardships,
marriages, and aids, and into the value of lands belonging to the king
as wardships or escheats. 4 "Sometimes they were commissioned only to
hear possessory assizes; but generally, it would seem, their chief busi-
ness was to hear both the pleas of the crown and the possessory assizes. " 25
In these commissioners, whose chief or only function was judicial work,
we can see the future judges of assize.
26
It is probable that before Henry II's reign these commissions were
not issued either frequently or regularly. Certainly they had no fixed
circuits.27 it was from the reign of Henry II that these justices regularly
traveled around the country. 28 "In 117.9, twenty-one justices were as-
signed to six circuits. From 11 76 onwards some part of the country was
regularly visited by the itinerant justices."-29 We can see that in Glanvil's
211 WILLIAM STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1897)
443. In 1096 William II sent Wakelin, Bishop of Winchester, Randolph, the royal
chaplain, and two others to Devonshire, Cornwall and Exeter "ad investiganda regalia
placita." BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 8, 69.
21 MADOX, op. cit. supra note 1, 146.
231 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50.
21Ibid. 5 0- 51.
1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156.
' 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 275-276.
2TBALDWIN, op.cit. supra note 9, 47-51.
21lbid.
21 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50.
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day the distinction between the Curia Regis and the itinerant justices is
already well marked. 30 The frequency with which these commissions
were issued seems not to have been altogether popular. Benedictus Abbas
tells us Henry II learned that the people were grieved by the number of
justices.:" It would perhaps be inconvenient for a landowner who had
land in many counties to be summoned before several groups of justices;
and since the king was often at a distance and the justices were not al-
ways members of the Curia Regis, they may have used their commissions
at times as instruments of oppression. At any rate the measure which
Henry took to remedy the complaints which he heard was a measure of
centralization. In this measure we can discern the germ of the future
Court of Common Pleas.
III. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
The following is the account which Benedictus Abbas gives us of
the remedy which Henry "by the counsel of the wise men of his realm"
applied to the complaints which he had heard of the number of justices:
"He selected five men only, two clerks and three laymen, who are all of
his own household. And he ordained that those five should hear all the
suits of the realm, and adjudicate them, and that they should not depart
from the Curia Regis, but should remain there to hear men's suits; pro-
vided that if any question arose among them which they could not solve,
it should be reserved for the king's hearing, and should be settled as it
should seem good to him and the wiser men of his realm."-3 2 This hap-
pened in 1178. 3  Henry's purpose was not to abolish the itinerant jus-
tices, for we see that they were still used in the next year. 34 Probably he
meant to relieve the pressure of business in the Curia Regis, and to give
a more speedy trial to those of his subjects who brought their cases to
this central court.
1 2 GLANVIL 5, "Distinguendum est utrum concordia illa facta fuerit in capitali
curia domina regis, an coram justitiis itinerantibus." SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(Selden Society) xix-xxi.
"'Itaque dominus rex moram faciens in Anglia quaesivit de justitiis quos in
Anglia constituerat, si bene et modeste tractaverunt homines regni; et cum didicisset
quod terra et homines terrae nimis gravati essent ex tanta Justitiarum multitudine, quia
octo decim erant numero," he devised the remedy described below. 1 BENEDICTUS
ABBAS (Roll Ser.) c. 3, n. 1. 207; 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51,
n. 5.
3" Per consilium sapientium regni sui quinque tantum elegit, duos scilicet clericos
et thres laicos, et erant omnes de privata familia suia. Et statuit quod illi quinque
audirent omnes clamores regni et rectum facerent, et quod a curia regis non recederent
sed ibi ad audiendum clamores hominum remanerent; ita ut si aliqua quaestio inter eos
veniret, quae per cos ad finem duci non posset, auditui regio praesentaretur, et sicut ei
et sapientoribus regni placeret terminaretur." 1 BENEDICTUS ABBAS (Roll Ser.) 207-
208: 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 5 1.
'BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 9, 47-51.3 Supra note 29.
The extent of this change must not be overestimated. There was
not yet a distinct Court of Common Pleas. As Maitland puts it, "The
king's court of John's reign shows no cleft, though it does show a well-
marked line of cleavage.""5 When the king was absent or otherwise in-
capacitated, as in the case of the minority of Henry III, most of the
judicial work seems to have been done by the Bench. When the king
was present it is difficult to distinguish the Bench from the court held
coram rege. Holdsworth remarks that "Whether the court will be the
Bench or the court held coran rege would almost seem to depend on the
accident of the king's presence." 36  The rolls of the Curia Regis seem to
point to the same thing. There was as yet not two sets of rolls-coram
rege and de banco rolls. However, it is possible to classify the cases ac-
cording as they were held with or without the king's presence. The ex-
pression coram rege is used in the former case, while the expressions
coram justiciariis de banco or apud Westmonasterium are used in the
latter.37 Nor would it seem to make any difference which branch of the
court tried the case. The Bench apparently entertained all classes of
pleas. A case might be transferred from one branch to the other at the
suggestion of the king or the justices. 3s
Notwithstanding this, however, we must not minimize the impor-
tance of this line of cleavage. Looking at it in the light of subsequent
history, we can see that it had at least three important consequences. In
the first place, we can see in it a tribunal of limited jurisdiction as con-
trasted with a tribunal of large undifferentiated powers of government:
and we can see that the tribunals with this limited jurisdiction were
mainly, though not solely, occupied with judicial work.3 9 In the second
place, most of the judicial work is done by writs, which is to lead to the
development of a highly technical procedure. This procedure and the
substantive law applied through it will tend to become common over
the whole of the kingdom.40 In the third place, the existence of a tri-
bunal occupied mainly in judicial matters under technical rules of pro-
cedure will lead to a very definite line of cleavage in the Curia Regis.
There will be a tendency for those engaged in the business of that tri-
mSELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN (S. S.) xvii.
161 HOLDSWORTH. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52.
$7Ibid. 5 3.
"'We may doubt whether a litigant had any reason to expect that an action
begun before one division of the court would always continue to be before that divi-"
sion; on the contrary there are entries which seem to show that the Justices of the Bench
might give the parties a day before the king, and that the king might give them a day
before the Justices." SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN (S. S.) xvii.




bunal to confine themselves more exclusively to those duties and to leave
the functions of administration to the other members.
However, this is all in the future, and before we attempt to show
those changes we must divert our attention to the uprising against the
tyrannous abuse by John of those large royal powers which his prede-
cessors had used to construct a centralized system of government and a
common law. The result of this insurrection was Magna Carta which
attempted to lay down certain rules as to the manner in which the king
should conduct his government. Naturally some of those regulations
had to do with the king's courts which had been so rapidly expanding
during the preceding half century. It is to those regulations and their
effect which we shall now confine our attention.
IV. MAGNA CARTA AND THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Magna Carta contains important provisions in reference to the reg-
ulation of the king's courts, but perhaps more important is the fact that
the Great Charter closes one period in the history of English law and is
the point of beginning of another. "It closes the period during which
the law is developed by the power of the crown alone, and begins the
period which will end in the establishment of a Parliament, with power
to take some share in the making and development of the law. " 4 1
The clauses of the Charter which are of interest to us in connection
with the Court of Common Pleas are the fourteenth, the seventeenth,
the eighteenth, the thirty-fourth, and the fortieth. Those clauses nat-
urally divide themselves into two main classes. In the first class are those
which recognize and regulate the new machinery of justice, while the
second class is made up of that clause, the thirty-fourth, which attempted
to fetter the king's courts in the interests of feudalism.
The fourteenth clause is as follows:
And for holding a common council of the Kingdom con-
cerning the assessment of an aid otherwise than in the three cases
mentioned above, or concerning the assessment of a scutage we
shall cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls,
and greater barons by our letters individually; and besides we shall
cause to be summoned generally, by our sheriffs and bailiffs all
those who hold from us in chief, for a certain day, that is at the
end of forty days at least, and for a certain place; and in all the
letters of that summons, we will express the cause of the summons,
and when the summons has thus been given, the business shall
" 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 54.
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proceed on the appointed day, all of those who were summoned
have come.42
This clause should be considered as an appendage to the twelfth
clause providing that such aids and scutage were not to be imposed
"nisi per commune consilium regni." It was intended to define who
must be present if the king was to obtain this "commune consiliurn
regni."4  This clause was dropped from later reissues of the Charter;
and it may seem at first thought to have had nothing to do with the
judicial system. However, Holdsworth feels that it is "the first offi-
cial recognition of the fact that the smaller official gatherings of the
Curia Regis were something different from the larger gatherings which
gave the king the 'consilium regni.' -44 However this may be, the fact
remains that this distinction does gain prominence in the reign of Henry
III and tends to differentiate the larger body, which controls the work
of legislation and administration, from the body of officials which
actually does the administrative and judicial work of the state.
The seventeenth clause provides that "The common pleas shall
not follow our court, but shall be held in some certain place. ' "- This
clause would show that even in 1215 there was some idea of a court in
the Curia Regis which was distinct from the court held coram rege.
This division was largely, though not solely, occupied with civil pleas,
and it did not follow the king. In fact it was generally held in West-
minster.46  This clause made it legally necessary that it should be a
stationary court. As has been noted the Common Pleas did at first
travel with the king. Later it seems to have been established at West-
minster, and was not moved except by the command of the king. It
was felt that the act of moving this court was an abuse by John, and
this prohibition was inserted to prevent future royal caprice in the
'2G. B. ADAMS and H. M. STEPHENS, SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY (1921) 44-45: "Et ad habendum commune consilium regni,
de auxilio assidendo aliter quam in tribus casibus praedictis, vel de scutagio assidendo,
summoneri faciemus achiepiscopos, episcopos, abbates, comites, et majores barones,
sigillatim per literas nostras; et praeterea faciemus summoneri in generali, per viceomites
et ballivos nostros, omnes illos qui de nobis tenent in capite." 1 HOLDSWORTH, HIS-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 55, n. 1.
"Sl HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 55.
"Ibid.
"ADAMS AND STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 42, 45; 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 56. "Communia placita non sequantur curiam nostram sed ten-
eantur in aliquo certo loco." McKechnie translates the "aliquo certo loco" as meaning
"some fixed place," W. S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (1905) 308.
"I1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56.
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matter.17  No town is named as the "aliquo certo loco," but McKechnie
feels that probably Westminster was intended."8
The eighteenth clause emphasized the need for the local adminis-
tration of justice by delegates from the Curia Regis in the case of certain
of these common pleas. It provided that the three possessory assizes
of novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor. and darrein presentrnent should be
tried in the counties where the cases arose; 49 and that they should be
taken in each county four times a year by two justices, assisted by four
knights of the county appointed by the county."' It is clear that this
clause is the strongest possible testimony to the success of Henry II's
reforms. No doubt these assizes took business from the feudal courts;
but so far were the barons from wishing to see them abolished that they
demanded their frequent sessions.
The fortieth clause provided that right and justice shall not be
sold, denied, or delayed. "' This clause again illustrates the fact that
royal justice was popular. The complaint is that it is too dear or that
it is not forthcoming. The clause did not wholly stop the evils of
which it complained, as later parliamentary petitions show, 52 but prob-
ably it did something to cheapen justice, and to stop the abuses which
"McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (1905) 310. 312-314.
"Ibid. 3 10. " 'The common place (common banke).' Banhe is a Saxon word,
and signifieth a bench or high seat, or a tribunall, and is properly applyed to the
justices of the court of common pleas, because the justices of that court sit there as in
a certaine place: * * * For the antiquity of the court of common pleas, they
erre. that hold that before the statute of Magna Charta there was no court of common
pleas. * * * And the statute of Magna Charta erecteth no court but giveth direc-
tion for the proper jurisdiction thereof in these words: communia placita non sequantur
curiam nostram, sed teneantur in aliquo certo loco. And properly the statute saith.
non sequantur, for that the king's bench did in those dayes follow the king ubicunque
fuetri in Anglia, and therefore enacteth that common pleas should be holden in a court
resident in a certaine place. In the next chapter of Magna Charta (made at one and the
same time) it is provided: et ea, quae per eosdem (s. justiciarios itinerantes) propter
difficultatem aliquorum terminari non possunt, referanter ad justiciarios nostros do
banco et ibi terminentur. And in the next to that, Assisae de ultima praesentatione
semper capiantur coram justiciariis de banco, et ibi terminentur. Therefore it mani-
festly appeareth, that at the making of the statute of Magna Charta there were justiciariis
de banco, which all men confesse to be the court of common pleas." 2 COKE, A
COMMiENTARY UPON LITTLETON (Ist Am. ed. 1853) c. 3, § 96, 71b. To the same
effect see J. F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (1894) 42. n. 1.
"'It is interesting to note that our theories concerning the proper venue of actions
involving the title to realty have not materially changed. Cf. COLO. RULES OF CIV.
PROC. Rule 98(a). See also COLO. CODF OF CIV. PROC. (1935) § 25.
"Recogniciones de nova disseisina. de morte antecessoris, et de ultima presenta-
cione. non capiantur nisi in suis comitatibus et hoc modo; nos. vel si extra regnum
fuerimus. capitalis justiciarius noster, mittemus duos justiciarios per unumquemque
comitatum per quatuor vices in anno, qui, cum quatuor militibus cujuslibet comitatus
electis per comitaturm, capiant im comitatu et in die et loco comitatus assisas
predictas: * * *"
-"Nulli vendemus, nulli regabimus, aut differemus rectum aut justiciam.-
"'STUBBS. op. cit. supra note 21. 636-637.
were ran :,ant in John's reign. Madox says, "Though fines for writs
and proccss of law in many cases were always a part of the crown
revenue, and were constantly paid * * * Yet, if my observation does
not fail me, the fines which were paid for writs and process of law,
were more moderate * * * than they used to be before; and, I think,
the actual denial of right, and the stopping. or delaying of it, which
before, upon paying of money or fines used to be practiced, were * * *
quite taken away, or by degrees brought into disuse.
'' r
53
The only clause in which we can see an attempt to fetter civil
justice is the thirty-fourth. That clause provides that "The writ which
is called Praecipe shall not be given for the future to anyone concerning
any tenement whereby a free man may lose his court.5 " The barons
apparently did not object to the assumption by the Curia Regis of juris-
diction over questions of possession.-- They did object to this assump-
tion of jurisdiction in cases where the ownership of the land was in
dispute. By means of the writ praecipe addressed to the sheriff, the
king ignored the feudal court of the lord and brought these cases before
his court. The barons demanded that this practice- should cease, and
that such cases should be tried by writ of right in the lord's court. This
form of writ praecipe therefore ceased to be issued, and tenants were
obliged to bring writs of right in the courts of their lords.5 7 But seignior-
ial justice was obviously so inferior to royal justice that as early as 1258
the nation "no longer demanded protection for seigniorial courts." It
asked rather that "the royal court should be endowed with yet new and
anti-feudal powers.'', s Although full effect was given to the clause, 
5
before a century had elapsed means were found to evade its operation.
°
V. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SINCE MAGNA CARTA
By the end of the reign of John, the distinction between the court
which was fixed at a certain place to hear common pleas, and the court
which followed the king, with jurisdiction over both common pleas and
pleas of the crown, was becoming fairly clear; but they were not yet
completely distinct. There was not as yet two bodies of judges, each
with separate duties and belonging to a separate court. The distinction
55MADOX, op. cit. supra note 1, 455.
MADAMS AND STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 42, 47. "Breve quod vocatur
Precipe de cetero non fiat alicui de aliquo tenemento unde liber homo amittere possit
curiam suam.
TMAGNA CARTA § 18.
'For this writ see I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW app. V.
573 Ibid. 3-29.
'1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203.
r'l HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59.
'For the methods by which this result was accomplished, see 3 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 3-29.
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would almost seem to depend on the accident of there being a king to
follow. During the minority of Henry III, there being no king to fol-
low, and the king's presence not as yet being a legal fiction, there was
only one court, the Common Pleas, and this court tried all of the cases. 61
In 1224, when Henry reached his majority, two courts again appeared.
The distinction between the two courts is further marked by the
fact that from 122462 onward they recorded their proceedings on sepa-
rate rolls.6 3 The rolls of the court held in the presence of the king were
called Rotuli.placitorum coram rege, while those of the Common Pleas
were called Ratuli placitorum de banco. 4 McKechnie feels that if any
date may be set for the complete separation, it must be that date at
which the two sets of rolls were begun.65
We have noted how in earlier times there seems to have been no
distinction made as to the classes of pleas which were to be tried in either
branch of the court.66 As early as 1237 we are able to see a change. In
that year a reported case shows that G. Marescallus was summoned to
warrant the title to certain manors which the king was claiming against
John Marescallus. He pleaded that this was a common plea, and could
not therefore be heard coram rege in the court which followed the king.
The court held that this was not a common plea because it touched the
person of the king and crown. 7
The position of the Chief Justiciar, that great officer of state who
was a politician and a soldier as well as, or perhaps more than, a creator
and administrator of the law, fell into disuse after 1265.,6 As early as
1272 a separate chief justice was appointed for the Common Pleas,69
and Holdsworth says that "From that date the separation was com-
plete."70
However, even in Edward I's reign it is not always possible to dis-
tinguish the court to which the different judges belong, and the juris-
diction of the court was not then in all points the same as that which it
afterwards possessed-"the special competence of each court is only
vaguely defined.71 But it is a court which has a separate set of rolls;
611 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195.
"2McKechnie states that the separate rolls were begun in 1234. MCKECHNIE, op.
cit. supra note 45, 314.
m1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196.
0 0MCKECHNIE, op. cit. supra note 45, 314-315.
6Jbid.
'Supra note 36.
OTBRACTON'S NOTE BOOK (MAITLAND, 1887) case 1220.
'The Common Law Courts as Established Under Edward I, 2 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 212.
OI CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (1873) 73.
701 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196.
71BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK (MAITLAND, 1887) 56.
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it has a separate chief justice; and it is inferior to the court which fol-
lows the king, since error lies from it to the court coran rege. Fleta
mentions the "banco apud Westm' " as a separate court,7 2 and Edward
I, in 1300, expressly declared that the hearing of common pleas in the
Exchequer or elsewhere out of the Common Bench, was contrary to the
provisions of the Great Charter.7 3 Lord Campbell states that by the
reign of Edward I, "our judicial institutions were firmly established on
the basis on which, with very little alteration, they have remained to
the present day."-
74
Magna Carta provided, as we have seen, that the court should sit"alquo certo loco." 71 Westminster was probably intended,7 6 and the
court in fact usually sat there; but it occasionally sat elsewhere. "In
1337 and 1392 it was at York, in 1544 it was at St. Albans, and in
1581 it was at Hertford. '- 7 7 It seems also to have been held at Win-
chester, at Gloucester, at Windsor, and at Lincoln.78  In the case of
Edward III, "when complaint was made that the Bench 'est errant de
Countee en Countee per tout le Roialme'," he refused to deprive himself
of the power to order the Bench to sit where he pleased; 7 and the power
is clearly assumed to exist in a statute of 1328.80
VI. JUDGES
The early judges of England were almost without exception clerics.
Indeed, we might say that holy orders were almost essential to any im-
portant judicial office of state, 81 and this condition persisted through the
early part of the thirteenth century.8 2 After that time, however, the
ecclesiastics were gradually replaced by men who had made their careers
at the bar. 3 The clergy continued to hold a monopoly on the study of
civil and canon law; but laymen were being drawn to the common law.
They organized themselves into societies known as Inns of Court, and
it is from these Inns that the future judges were drawn.14 At the begin-
ning of the reign of Edward I, that sovereign appointed laymen Chief
Justices for both the-King's Bench and the Common Pleas;85 but the
122 FLETA, COMMENTARIUS JURIs ANGLICANI (1647) c. 2.
1328 EDw. I.
741 CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 71.
7 Supra note 45.
1 Supra note 48.
771 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196-197.
7'DILLON, op. cit. supra note 48, 42, n. 1.
1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197.
102 EDw. III, c. 2.
"'I CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 1-70.
a~l HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197.
nIbid.
8'1 CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 73.
9'lbid.
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belief that the characters of causidicus and clericus must be united per-
sisted to such an extent as to oblige the Chief Justice of the King's Bench
to become a canon of St. Paul's in order to further his success.8 6 How-
ever, with the exception of Hervey of Staunton, who became Chief
Justice in 1326, no clerical judge was appointed after 13 16.87
On March 8, 1268, Robert de Brus, the grandfather of the later
and perhaps more famous Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, was by Henry
III appointed Capitatis Just iciarius ad placita coram Rege tenenda, the
modern designation of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench.88 Dugdale
places his name at the head of a new list of judges, who have exercised
only judicial functions.88 This restriction seems to have resulted, not
from any legislative enactment, but rather from an "understanding that
the person who presided was no longer to interfere in military affairs or
in the government of the kingdom.'-9
In 1272, Edward I appointed Thomas de Weyland Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas at the rather insignificant salary of sixty marks a
year. 91 A small pittance was allowed with which to purchase robes, and
industry was stimulated by fees on the causes tried. -9 2 The Chief Justice,
presumably because of the smallness of the salary, seems to have re-
sorted to irregular practices for the purpose of increasing his sustenance,
and we are told that "he left a name often quoted as a reproach to the
Bench." 9
By 1316 the order of serjeants-at-law had been formed.9 4 This
order consisted of the leading practitioners who were promoted to mem-
bership by the crown. 95 When the practice of drawing judges from the
clergy ceased, it was but natural that those officials should be drawn
from this order. Indeed, in a short time judges were drawn solely from
this group. 96 This practice probably had its beginning in the Common
mlbid.
871 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197.
m'l CAMPBELL, op. cit supra note 69, 65-68.
80Ibid. 65.
'0lbid.
911 CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 73; 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 196. Inderwick, The Common Law Courts as Established Under
Edward I, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 211,
states that one Thomas de Muleton was appointed Chief Justice of the "Common
Bench" in 1235, "being the first Chief Justice of either of the Courts )f Common
Law." I have been unable to verify this statement.
921 CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 73.
P'I CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra note 69, 79.
"'1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197. "It was to conceal the
want of clerical tonsure that the sergeants-at-law * * * adopted the coif, or
black velvet cap, which became the badge of their order." I CAMPBELL, op. cit. supra
note 69, 73, n. 1.
'1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197.
16Ibid.
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Pleas. By the fourteenth century, it had extended to the King's Bench,
ar.d by the sixteenth century, to the Exchequer,9  By this time the prac-
tice had become somewhat of a form; and it "became the custom to make
any lawyer, whom it was destined to raise to the bench, a serjeant-at-
law, merely that he might be made a judge.'"'" The rule was not altered
until the Judicature Act of 1873. 99
The early judges held their offices during the royal pleasure, and
this rule apparently was followed for several centuries. °00 However, in
the ACT OF SETTLEMENT0l it was provided that judges should hold
office "quamdiu se bene gesserint"; but that it should be lawful for the
crown to remove them on an address by the two houses of parliament.
They continued to vacate their offices at the demise of the crown. In the
reign of Anne, it was provided that they should hold their offices for a
space of six months after the demise of the crown, 1 2 and in 1760 a
statute was enacted providing that tenure of judges should be unaffected
by the demise of the crown. 0 3
VII. JURISDICTION
We may group the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas
under four heads:
(I) It had, like other courts of common law, exclusive jurisdic-
tion over its own officials or other persons privileged to sue and be sued
before it.104
(2) It had jurisdiction to supervise or correct the errors of the
older local courts. Cases were transferred to it by the writ of pone '
from the county court, the hundred court, or the court baron;' 6 and by
various writs of recordari facias, accedas ad hundredum, or accedas ad
curiam, and was able to correct the judgments of these courts.10  How-
ever, these courts gradually fell into disuse, and their places were taken
by the justices of the peace. There was serious doubt as to the power of
the Common Pleas to review the judgments of these justices. Moreover,
the advantage to be derived from bringing error to the Common Pleas
was small, since it was possible for the party defeated to obtain a second
0lbid.
Ibid.
'36 F4 37 VICT. c. 66. § 8.
1'1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195.
1012 U 13 WILL. III, c. 2. § 3.
1026 ANNE c. 7, § 8.
1011 GEO. III, c. 23.
1041 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203.
'For an example of this writ. see 1 HOLDSWORTH. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW.
app. VII.
1011 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 200.
"'Ibid. 201.
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writ of error to the King's Bench. For this reason suitors generally
brought error directly to the higher court, 1 8 and thus the question still
remained doubtful. However, in 1841, the court asserted its jurisdic-
tion in such cases,1 09 and that decision was approved in a later case in
the King's Bench. 10
(3) In the seventeenth century the court acquired a general juris-
diction to issue two of the prerogative writs-the writ of prohibition
and the writ of habeas corpus.1 ' There was some controversy as to how
far the right to issue the latter writ extended, but this was settled by the
HABEAS CORPUS AMENDMENT ACT' 12 of 1679, which gave a general
jurisdiction to issue this writ to all three of the common law courts.
(4) By far the most important branch of jurisdiction was that
which was exercised over common pleas-that is over actions between
subject and subject. This court was the only one of the courts of com-
mon law where real actions and the older personal actions of debt,
detinue, account, and covenant could be tried. 13 Furthermore, it could
not lose its jurisdiction except by express words in a charter, covenant,
or other instrument granting this jurisdiction to another court.,"4 This
monopoly lasted until the abolition of these actions in 1833-1873."'1
However, long before their formal abolition, the King's Bench and the
Exchequer, by means of fictions, had encroached upon the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Common Pleas over mixed and personal
actions."16 At first this encroachment was relatively unimportant because
most of the more important and lucrative actions were those affecting
realty, and of these the Common Pleas still had exclusive jurisdiction. I7
Furthermore, the fact that the court was stationary attracted a large and
capable bar, and therefore tended to increase the business." s In 1309
there was so much business that Edward II ordered that it should sit in
two divisions." 9 Coke writes that this court is the "lock and key of the
common law; for herein only can real actions, that is actions which
concern the right of freehold or the realty, be originally brought; and all
other or personal pleas between man and man are likewise here deter-
mined; though in most of them the king's bench has also a concurrent
"'Ibid.
"Bruce v. Wait, 1 Man. U G. 1.
"1Darlow v. Shuttleworth, 1 K. B. 725 (1902).
"' HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 202.
U2 31 CHAS. II, c. 2, § 3.
"11 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 198.
"'Ibid.
1153 & 4 WILL. IV, c. 27, § 36; 23 & 24 VICT. c. 126, § 26 (real actions) : 38
1E 39 VICT., c. 77, Sched. i (all forms of actions).





authority. "120 In a like manner the Year Books show that during the
Middle Ages, by far the greater amount of litigation was conducted in
the Common Pleas.121
From the sixteenth century on, however, we note a change. The
old real actions were ceasing to be of such great importance. Further-
more, both the old real and the old personal actions were exceedingly
technical, and the plaintiff lost if he were so unfortunate as to choose
the wrong writ.122 The action of ejectment was coming into use, and
since this was a form of trespass, it could be tried equally well in the
King's Bench.1 2' Likewise the older personal actions were being super-
seded by a variety of forms of trespass on the case, and these could also
be tried in the King's Bench. In addition, an action could be tried more
cheaply in the King's Bench, and the plaintiff was less apt to be an-
noyed by delays. 1 2  Hale writes that the King's Bench was the "nursery
of young professors," while the Common Pleas was merely the "place
of practice of serjeants."12 5 The Common Pleas tried to meet this com-
petition with cheaper and better processes, and by adopting the fictions
of the King's Bench, but was only partially successful, and in the nine-
teenth century the King's Bench still held the lion's share of the busi-
ness. 1 26 Then by the JUDICATURE ACT of 1873127 the court was abol-
ished, and its jurisdiction, as well as that of the King's Bench, the Ex-
chequer, the Chancery and others, was taken over by the new High
Court of Justice with its various sections.
The Court of Common Pleas was gone, but its work was done.
1"3 Bi. COMM. *40.





"'Between the years 1823 and 1827 there were begun in the King's Bench
281,109 actions, in the Common Pleas 80,158, and in the Exchequer 27,197."
1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 200. n. 8.
m36 V4 37, VICT. c. 66.
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The Neighborhood Law Office Plan
By RAYNOR M. GARDINER*
The Neighborhood Law Office plan has had a great deal of pub-
licity during the last few years. As far as I know, Philadelphia is the
only place where the low cost or neighborhood plan has been tried. The
experiment is still continuing and it is too soon to tell just how it will
come out.
The idea of a chain of offices on the outskirts of a city, giving
advice at a low fixed fee, sounds attractive. I am cynical enough to
*General Counsel of the Boston Legal Aid Society in the BAR BULLETIN of the
Bar Association of the City of Boston.
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assume that the purpose of these offices is primarily to get clients-that
the clients will also be benefited is purely incidental.
The experiment in Philadelphia shows that these offices can appar-
ently be made self-sustaining. In the long run, however, they must
show a fair profit or they will eventually fold up.
The potential clients of a -neighborhood office range all the way
from those who are just above Legal Aid or social service level to the
moderately well-to-do business and professional man. The proprietors
of the local laundry, garage or store are not apt to consult the neighbor-
hood law office. They will be much more inclined to patronize an in-
town law firm. Other competitors of the neighborhood office are the
lawyers who have long been established in most suburban districts of
every large city and, while few of them have a large practice, its amount,
in the aggregate, is considerable.
It is true that a large percentage of the clients who go to a neigh-
borhood law office have never consulted a lawyer before. They, there-
fore, represent an untapped field, but the fact that they have never had
occasion to see a lawyer indicates that they rarely need one. If this is
true, it would take many hundreds of these people to build up any sort
of a decent practice.
I believe that the chances of a neighborhood law office's making a
real success are not good. People instinctively have a rather low opinion
of all doctors, dentists and lawyers who work at cut-rate prices. They
may know that a particular doctor at a clinic is a good man, they may
be aware that the attorneys of the Legal Aid Society are very experienced
in certain fields of law, but they would much prefer to consult a doctor
or lawyer of their own choosing.
A client recently summed it all up to me as follows: "I would not
come to you if I could possibly afford to go to a good lawyer." That, it
seems to me, is the catch in the Neighborhood Law Office idea and that
is the principal reason it will not succeed.
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Book Review
LAWFUL ACTION OF STATE MILITARY FORCES, by Edmund Ruffin
Beckwith, James S. Holland, George W. Bacon and Joseph W. McGovern; with a
Foreword by Hugh A. Drum, lieutenant general U. S. Army (retired); 1944, New
York, Random House, xviii, 216; and 1944 supplement, 32; paper $1.50, cloth
$3.00.
This is a very timely manual defining the powers and duties of
state troops and codifying the rights and responsibilities of the militia
in war and in domestic disturbances. Lieutenant Colonel Beckwith is
judge advocate and Major Holland is assistant judge advocate of the
New York Guard. Mr. Bacon is a professor of law and Mr. McGovern
an associate professor of law in the Fordham University school of law.
The authors start from the premise that under our federal and state
constitutional systems the military is subordinate to the civil power, but
that these systems recognize the necessity of a well-regulated militia to
maintain the security of a free state. Because the civil law is supreme
when state troops are on domestic duty, they can only be employed law-
fully when they are needed to maintain the peace and security of some
portion of the state. When so employed they can take only such action
as is appropriate to the accomplishment of their mission.
Commanding officers of state military forces should have some
knowledge of their rights and duties so that they can perform the work
they are called upon to do without usurping any of the functions of the
civil government. We do not know of any other code or manual which
confines itself to an exposition of these particular rules, nor do we know
of any work so conveniently arranged to accomplish this purpose.
The book sets forth the rules governing the use of state troops in
domestic disturbances in time of peace as well as the rules governing those
troops in time of war. For that reason it should continue to be useful
after the end of the present conflict. It is arranged in code form, in a
series of numbered topical paragraphs, and is well indexed for easy ref-
erence. The paper-bound edition contains the text without footnotes or
annotations. The cloth-bound edition carries the annotations and other
collateral matter in a pocket supplement which will allow for further
revision and expansion.
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Code of Ethics and Principles for the Prosecution and
Defense of Criminal Cases*
PREAMBLE
Justice is the firmest pillar of good government. The entire struc-
ture of our democracy is built upon it. The true administration of crim-
inal justice is the foundation upon which our civil rights and liberties
are maintained. It is in the criminal courts that the rights guaranteed to
the individual under our constitutional form of government will either
stand or fall under the impact of the present national emergency. Of
equal importance to the democratic process, which provides for the right
of free men to choose their representatives and to elect their government,
is the right of free men to be protected against unjust accusation and
oppression. No greater privilege or higher duty ever comes to any lawyer
than the opportunity to defend persons accused of crime or to prosecute
crime in the name of a free people to the end, not that convictions be
had, but that justice be done. It is not sufficient to have well written
penal laws, for they cannot be justly and soundly administered in a
manner which upholds the Bill of Rights unless certain principles of
conduct in the prosecution and defense of criminal cases become im-
bedded in the system of American criminal justice.
The judge, prosecutor or defense lawyer who believes that he can
let his conscience be his sole guide is following a course which leads to a
government of men instead of laws. A lawless administration of justice
based upon the philosophy that the end justifies the means so long as it
satisfies the conscience of the court and its officers is the greatest threat to
civil liberties of a free people. "At the foundation of our civil liberty
lies the principle which denies to government officials an exceptional
position before the law and which subjects them to the same rules of
conduct that are commands to the citizens." Judges should always
remember that their office is jus dicere not jus dare; to interpret law, and
not to make law or give law.
The true administration of criminal justice cannot be achieved un-
less the accused is afforded the benefit of the presumption of innocence in
a real and not "lip service" manner; it cannot be achieved unless guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt in the manner provided by law;
it cannot be achieved if, as a practical matter, an accused must bear some
burden in proving his innocence. Neither is it for prosecutors to decide
the guilt of the accused, nor for defense lawyers to decide their innocence.
It is not for the conscience of any man to prescribe the line between right
and wrong and to determine any other man's guilt or innocence. For
that purpose, by tradition and long experience, we have set up an admin-
istration of criminal justice based on settled principles of law.
*Reprinted by permission from the April, 1943, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY.
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1 Advising Clients as to the Effect of Penal Laws
A client is entitled to receive and a lawyer is entitled to give an
opinion and advice as to what constitutes a violation of a penal statute
and a lawyer may advise a client as to any question of constitutional law,
rule of evidence, or any other matter relating to the administration of
criminal justice. Since every person is answerable for every infraction of
the law because he is presumed to know the law, it is the duty of an
attorney to inform his client fully concerning any and every pertinent
question of law. But a lawyer may not advise his client how the law
may be violated with impunity. Nor may he make any professional
arrangement where the effect thereof is to encourage lawless conduct.
2. Undertaking Defense of Future Offense
Any conduct of an attorney which directly or indirectly aids or
abets the commission of, or tends to aid, abet or encourage the commis-
sion of crime is reprehensible. An attorney may not undertake in ad-
vance to defend persons for offenses to be committed, as such an arrange-
ment encourages the commission of crime.
3. Duty to Defend Regardless of Attorney's Opinion as to Guilt
Included in A. B. A. Canon 5.
4. Limitation on Duty to Defend
Canon 16. (Forbids countenancing perjury or any other fraudu-
lent or deceitful practice.)
5. Counsel Assigned to Indigent Prisoners; Volunteer Attorneys
This covers the ground of Canon 5, but adds that the assignment
should not be accepted unless the lawyer is fully qualified and has the
time and means to do the job properly.
6. Duty to Protect Client When Withdrawing as Counsel
Covered by A. B. A. Canon 44.
7. Responsibility of Each Attorney Regardless of Number
Where more than one attorney has been assigned to represent an
indigent defendant, or where there are a number of attorneys acting for
a defendant, each attorney should bear the same responsibility as if act-
ing as sole counsel.
8. Dealing of Prosecutor with the Accused
Regardless of the personal opinion of a prosecutor as to the guilt
of the defendant or any advantage which might accrue to the defendant,
he should not negotiate or bargain with the accused for a plea of guilty
or other disposition of a criminal case except through counsel. It is im-
proper for a prosecutor to attempt to obtain such a plea by threat, direct
or implied; and no representation or promise should be made by a prose-
cutor to the defendant except in the presence of counsel.
DICTA 127
9. Disclosure of Inducements Made to Witnesses
It is the duty of both prosecutor and defense attorney to disclose
fully to the court and jury any promise or inducement which may have
been made to obtain the testimony of any witness, so that the court and
jury may be thoroughly apprised of any bias or motive which may influ-
ence or affect the evidence given by the witness.
10. Where Civil and Criminal Rights Arise Out of Same Facts
An attorney has the right and at times it becomes his duty to bring
to the attention of the public authorities information that he may have
concerning the commission of a crime where the information is not re-
ceived as a confidential communication. However, a lawyer is never
justified in using criminal proceedings for the purpose of collecting a
civil debt or enforcing a civil right. A prosecutor or attorney should not
prefer a criminal charge in order to influence the result or decision in a
civil controversy or for the effect it may have on any thing or matter
outside the issue of the charge itself.
11. Disclosing Settlement of Civil Claim Which May Affect Criminal
Proceedings
A civil claim arising out of acts upon which a criminal proceeding
is predicated should not be compromised before full and complete dis-
closure to the prosecuting officer and to the court.
12. Confidential Communications Between Attorney and Client
See A. B. A. Canon 37.
13. Confining the Use of Court Process to Purposes Intended and Fixed
by Law
The process of the court must not be abused or used for purposes
other than as provided and intended by law. The secrecy of grand jury
proceedings is an exception to the fundamental tenet of the American
system of justice that all judicial proceedings should be open and public.
Grand jury proceedings are invested with secrecy primarily to prevent
premature and unsupported accusation. Hence such proceedings should
not be used except for the purpose intended by law of basing indictments
on prima facie proof. Where indictments have been returned, the process
of the grand jury should not be used for the preparation of trials and it
must be borne in mind that the examination of prospective witnesses in
secret may easily lead to intimidation of witnesses and oppression.
14. Simulating Court Process
Unless permitted by law to compel testimony before himself, a
prosecutor should not serve papers having the appearance of subpoenas
or other process of the court, nor should a prosecutor use court or grand
jury process to compel persons to appear and testify before him person-
ally.
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15. Limitation on Argument and Advocacy by Prosecutors and At-
torneys
This combines the second paragraph of Canon 15, forbidding as-
sertion in argument of the lawyer's personal opinion with the further
point that,
Argument should be confined strictly to the crime charged and an
assertion or implication that extraneous circumstances exist beyond the
crime charged, which should influence the verdict, is never justified.
16. Personal Conduct of Attorneys in Dealing with Prosecutors
Am attorney engaged to defend a client in a criminal case must use
scrupulous care in his relationship with prosecuting officers and avoid
any act which may subject him or such officer to a misconstruction of
motive. He should not only avoid any impropriety in his relations with
prosecuting officers but in the interest of preserving public respect for the
courts and the administration of criminal justice he should likewise
avoid all semblance of impropriety.
17. Conferring with Defendants Who Have or Should Have Counsel
This covers the ground of A. B. A. Canon 9, along with further
suggestions in the case of co-defendants.
18. Former Prosecutors: Limitation on Accepting Cases
Covered in A. B. A. Canon 36.
19. Constitutional Privilege Against Self Incrimination
An attorney, as any other citizen, has the right to assert a claim of
privilege against self incrimination or to refuse to waive immunity when
called to testify in a criminal proceeding. Otherwise, attorneys as a class
would be deprived of a right preserved to others under our constitutional
form of government. But an attorney, when called as a witness, is never
justified in asserting the privilege against self incrimination for the pur-
pose of avoiding non-incriminating answers.
20. Duty to Help Maintain Respect for Criminal Justice
21. Duty as Officer of Court to Be Truthful and Candid
These two are covered under A. B. A. Canon I, "The Lawyer's
Duty to the Courts."
22. Attitude Toward Jury and Jury Panels
A. B. A. Canon 23.
23. Ex Parte Communication
Attorneys and prosecutors should avoid all ex parte communica-
tions to the court. When an ex parte communication or application be-
comes necessary in the interests of justice by reason of any emergency,
the fact that it has been made should be disclosed as promptly and as
fully as possible.
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24. Personal Relations Between Advocates, Witnesses and Parties
A lengthy section with a forty-word title, covering the ground of
A. B. A. Canons 16 and 17.
25. The Paramount Duty
Similar to the second paragraph of A. B. A. Canon 5.
They Wanted It of Record
In abstracting titles to real estate one occasionally runs across some
rather curious instruments which have been recorded.
An abstracter in southeast Missouri sent in the affidavit below and
stated it was recorded in his county in 1940. He had just extended an
abstract on property belonginfg to the makers of the affidavit, but de-
cided that the affidavit wouldn't affect the title to the real estate, so, of
course, it was not shown in the abstract. Since the parties are still living
it will be obvious why their names have been omitted.
I ----------- swear that I will stand by my wife and uphold all
she says and will never speak a wrong word to her. I will allow my wife
to buy what she deems necessary and I will give her money without her
asking for it. I further swear that I will never go back to Knob Lick,
Mo., and if I should ever meet ------------ I will not acknowledge her
presence. I also swear that I stayed a night and took meals with above
mentioned Mrs ----------- she and I were alone in the house; which
fact my wife never found out for over a year. I also had indecent deal-
ings with Mrs. ------------ before I married my wife and will swear
by whatever my wife should say in regard to this affair. I swear that
my wife is, and has always been, a true and virtuous wife.
Signed: --
Subscribed and sworn to before me this October 21, 1940.
Signed:
(SEAL) My Term expires 6-1-43
Notary Public
I, -------------- swear that I will never bring up the subject of
above paragraph; I will trust my husband and do all I can to help him
to bring about peace, if he abides by above.
Signed:------------
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st ---------- 1940.
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